Rejoinder - Causes and Implications of Some Bidders Not Conforming to the Sealed-Bid Abstraction

نویسندگان

  • Robert Zeithammer
  • Christopher Adams
چکیده

T paper presents the authors’ rejoinder to Zeithammer and Adams [Zeithammer, R., C. Adams. 2010. The sealed-bid abstraction in online auctions. Marketing Sci. 29(6) 964–987]. This rejoinder clarifies and qualifies conclusions of the original paper and makes suggestions for fruitful areas of future research. In particular, the original paper shows that bidding style can make a big difference in managerial decisions, but a structural model would be necessary to make confident predictions under different reserve prices. The rejoinder also clarifies the interpretation of feedback as a measure of bidder experience, and the relationship between bidder experience and bidding style.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Marketing Science

دوره 29  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010