“Meaningful” social inferences: EVects of implicit theories on inferential processes

Perceivers’ shared theories about the social world have long featured prominently in social inference research. Here, we investigate how fundamental diVerences in such theories inXuence basic inferential processes. Past work has typically shown that integrating multiple interpretations of behavior during social inference requires cognitive resources. However, three studies that measured or manipulated people’s beliefs about the stable versus dynamic nature of human attributes (i.e., their entity vs. incremental theory, respectively) qualify these past Wndings. Results revealed that, when interpreting others’ actions, perceivers’ theories selectively facilitate the consideration of interpretations that are especially theory-relevant. While experiencing cognitive load, entity theorists continued to incorporate information about stable dispositions (but not about dynamic social situations) in their social inferences, whereas incremental theorists continued to incorporate information about dynamic social situations (but not about stable traits). Implications of these results for how perceivers Wnd meaning in behavior are discussed. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.