Repeated Games with Frequent Signals∗ Drew Fudenberg
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public signals, where the signals are aggregates of many discrete events, such as sales or tasks. The high-frequency limit of the equilibrium set depends both on the probability law governing the discrete events and on how many events are aggregated into a single signal. When the underlying events have a binomial distribution, the limit equilibria correspond to the equilibria of the associated continuous-time game with diffusion signals, but other event processes that aggregate to a diffusion limit can have a different set of limit equilibria. Thus the continuous-time game need not be a good approximation of the high-frequency limit when the underlying events have three or more possible values.
منابع مشابه
Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring
We study two modi cations of the standard model of repeated games with public signals. In one modi cation, players osberve an underlying public signal at random and privately known times, where the public signals are Poisson events and either the observations occur within a small epsilon time interval or the obsevations have an exponential waiting times. In the second modi cation, the players o...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Frequent Signals
We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public signals, where the signals are the aggregate of many discrete events, such as sales or tasks. The high-frequency limit of the equilibrium set depends on both the probability law governing the discrete events and on how many events are aggregated into a single signal. When the underlying events have a binomial distributi...
متن کاملRepeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
Article history: Received 11 June 2009 Available online 16 September 2010 JEL classification: C02 C73
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