A Framework for Grounding Formal Epistemic Coherence Requirements

This presentation is about (i) formal, (ii) synchronic, (iii) epistemic (iv) coherence (v) requirements. (i) Formal coherence is to be distinguished from other sorts of coherence discussed in contemporary epistemology (e.g., in some empirical, truth/knowledge-conducive sense [1]). Ideally, whether a set of judgments is coherent (in the present sense) should (in principle) be determinable a priori. (ii) Synchronic coherence has to do with the coherence of a set of judgments held by an agent S at a single time t. So, we’ll not be discussing any diachronic requirements. (iii) Epistemic coherence is meant to involve some distinctively epistemic values (e.g., accuracy and evidential support). This is to be distinguished from pragmatic coherence (e.g., immunity from arbitrage, dutch books, and the like).