Ordinal Solutions to Bargaining Problems
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چکیده
A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley (1969) has shown that there exists no ordinal, efficient, and symmetric solution to twoplayer bargaining problems, and has constructed such a solution to threeplayer problems. Here, Shapley’s solution is extended in two directions. First, it is shown how to construct an infinite family of such solutions that includes Shapley’s. Second, the family of solutions is constructed for bargaining problems with any number of players greater than two. The construction makes use of gradual bargaining solutions suggested by O’Neill et al. (2001).
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تاریخ انتشار 2002