An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
نویسنده
چکیده
=959444. 17P07044.indd 128 6/13/07 9:17:39 AM VOL. 97 NO. 2 129 AN ASCENDING AuCtION fOR INtERDEPENDENt VALuES The dynamic game introduces the possibility that a player can strategically commit in order to affect the behavior of the other agents. The analysis above suggests that the strategic value of the commitment does not interfere with our analysis. The absence of a strategic value of commitment is due, here, to the careful design of the monetary transfers that neutralize the strategic value of commitment.
منابع مشابه
AN ASCENDING AUCTION FOR INDEPENDENT VALUES: UNIQUENESS AND ROBUSTNESS TO STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY BY DIRK BERGEMANN and STEPHEN MORRIS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1207 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
=959444. 17P07044.indd 128 6/12/07 2:34:36 PM VOL. 97 NO. 2 129 AN ASCENDING AuCtION fOR INtERDEPENDENt VALuES The dynamic game introduces the possibility that a player can strategically commit in order to affect the behavior of the other agents. The analysis above suggests that the strategic value of the commitment does not interfere with our analysis. The absence of a strategic value of commi...
متن کاملAuction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty
The robustness of the Bayes–Nash equilibrium prediction for seller revenue in auctions is investigated. In a framework of interdependent valuations generated from independent signals, seller expected revenue may fall well below the equilibrium prediction, even though the individual payoff consequences of suboptimal bidding may be small for each individual bidder. This possibility would be relev...
متن کاملAn Efficient Ascending Auction
This paper proposes an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when the seller is restricted to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid and agents have interdependent values. This ascending auction generalizes Bikhchandani et al. (2011) who assume agents have independent private values; and Perry and Reny (2005) who study multi-unit good auctions. The key feature of the...
متن کاملA New Combination of Robust-possibilistic Mathematical Programming for Resilient Supply Chain Network under Disruptions and Uncertainty: A Real Supply Chain (RESEARCH NOTE)
Nowadays, the design of a strategic supply chain network under disruption is one of the most important priorities of the governments. One of the strategic purposes of managers is to supply the sustainable agricultural products and food in stable conditions which require the production of soil nutrients. In this regard, some disruptions such as sanctions and natural disasters have a destructive ...
متن کاملAn Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel’s (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny’s (2002) generalization of Vickrey’s (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007