Supply Chain Coordination with a Risk-Averse Retailer and a Risk-Neutral Supplier

نویسندگان

  • Xianghua Gan
  • Suresh Sethi
  • Houmin Yan
چکیده

We investigate how a supply chain, formed by a risk-neutral supplier and a riskaverse retailer, can be coordinated with a supply contract. We demonstrate that the standard wholesale, buy-back or revenue-sharing contracts do not coordinate such a channel. We propose a definition of coordination of the supply chain, and design an easy-to-implement risk-sharing contract that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer as well as channel coordination both in terms of expected profit and risk.

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تاریخ انتشار 2003