Designing Benchmarking and Auction Mechanisms

نویسنده

  • Kurt Nielsen
چکیده

This paper provides an overview and some theoretical background for my PhD thesis. The thesis is a series of papers that focuses on improving internal and external allocation. The first two papers develop existing benchmarking technics and hereby facilitate a better basis for decision making within a firm. The next four papers consider more stringent mechanisms that aim at efficient external allocation.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004