Vadim Cherepanov , Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni
نویسندگان
چکیده
In 1908 the Welsh neurologist and psychoanlayst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by "the necessity of providing an explanation." We construct a formal model of rationalization. In our model a decision maker selects the best feasible alternative (according to her preferences) from among those that she can rationalize. We show that this theory can accommodate several behavioral anomalies and yet the theory is falsifiable and can be tested non-parametrically like the standard theory of choice. Rationalization theory produces a formal way to use (perhaps contradictory) speech to reveal agents’ motivations and a formal way to interpret experimental evidence where revealed preferences and observed choice need not coincide. In particular, rationalization theory can be used to reveal hidden preferences for discrimination. In addition, rationalization theory can be used to understand behavioral changes in the absence of changes in preferences, incentives and opportunity. Finally, rationalization theory can be easily incorporated into game
منابع مشابه
The Foundations of Warm-Glow Theory∗
∗Alvaro Sandroni [[email protected]] may be reached at the Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. Tim Feddersen [[email protected]] may be reached at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University.
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