A Maschler Type Algorithm For Computing Multiweighted Shapley Values Of Cooperative Tu Games

نویسنده

  • Irinel Dragan
چکیده

In an earlier paper of the author, the Multiweighted Shapley Values (MWSVs) have been introduced as linear operators on the space of TU games, which satisfy the efficiency and the dummy player axioms. An early dynamic algorithm for computing the Shapley Value is due to late M.Maschler. In the present work, we present a similar algorithm for computing the Multiweighted Shapley Values. For different systems of weights, the algorithm will compute many well known values like the Shapley Value , the Weighted Shapley Value, the Semivalues, the Harsanyi payoff vectors, a.s.o.

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تاریخ انتشار 2009