Social Context Congestion Games

نویسندگان

  • Vittorio Bilò
  • Alessandro Celi
  • Michele Flammini
  • Vasco Gallotti
چکیده

The widespread of decentralized and autonomous computational systems, such as highly distributed networks, has rapidly increased the interest of computer scientists for existence and efficiency of equilib-ria solutions in presence of selfish non-cooperative users. Nevertheless, there are scenarios of practical application (i.e., social networks) in which it can be observed a certain degree of cooperation among users who are related by some kind of knowledge relationships. In such environments, in fact, it may be the case that the happiness of a player does not depend only on her experienced utility, but it is rather somehow related to the one of her " friends ". As a consequence, considerable research effort is being devoted to the determination and investigation of suitable frameworks able to combine in a realistic way game theoretical concepts with social network aspects. Such a task is usually accomplished by coupling a standard non-cooperative game with a social graph expressing some kind of relationship among the players involved in the game. Social graphs, termed as social knowledge graphs, were first used in [2–4,6] in order to model the lack of complete information among players. In particular, each player in the game is represented as a node in the graph and it is assumed that there exists an edge between node v i and node v j if and only if player i knows player j's adopted strategy. Another model, exploiting social graphs in a different and perhaps more powerful way, is that of social context games introduced in [1]. These kinds of games constitute an interesting extension able to capture important concepts related to social aspects in non-cooperative games, like, for instance, collaboration, coordination and collusion among subsets of players. Consider a strategic game SG defined by a given set of players, strategies and payoff functions which we assume, without loss of generality, to be costs for the players and which are called immediate costs. Given a social graph G, termed here as social context graph, the neighborhood of node v i in G defines the set of players interacting with player i. The particular type of interaction is then characterized by an aggregation function f which maps tuples of real values into real values. A social context game, defined by the triple (SG, G, f), is a game in which players play as in SG and the cost experienced by player i, called perceived cost, is obtained …

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تاریخ انتشار 2011