Levi’s Account of Preference Reversals
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper argues that Levi’s account of preference reversals is only a limited success. Levisucceeds in showing that an agent acting in accord with his theory may exhibit reversals.Nevertheless, the specific account that Levi presents in order to accommodate the behaviorof experimental subjects appears to be disconfirmed by available evidence. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTEErik Angner is a graduate student in the Department of History and Philosophy of Scienceand in the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh. He is the co-author(with George Loewenstein) of ‘Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences,’ to appear in Loewenstein, Read, and Baumeister (eds) Time and Decision: The economics and psychologyof intertemporal choice (New York: Russell Sage).
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