On the Observational Equivalence of Continuous-Time Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions

This paper presents and philosophically assesses three types of results on the observational equivalence of continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. The first results establish observational equivalence to abstract mathematical descriptions. The second results are stronger because they show observational equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. Here I also discuss Kolmogorov’s contribution. For the third results I introduce two new meanings of ‘observational equivalence at every observation level’. Then I show the even stronger result of observational equivalence at every (and not just some) observation level between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. These results imply the following. Suppose one wants to find out whether a phenomenon is best modeled as deterministic or indeterministic. Then one cannot appeal to differences in the probability distributions of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science to argue that one of the descriptions is preferable because there is no such difference. Finally, I criticise the extant claims of philosophers and mathematicians on observational equivalence.