Securing Russian Nuclear Materials: the Need for an Expanded Us Response

Todd Perry is Washington Representative for Arms Control and International Security for the Union of Concerned Scientists, and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. Economic conditions in Russia in the wake of the August 17, 1998 devaluation of the Russian ruble have substantially increased the risk of theft at the dozens of former Soviet nuclear sites containing an estimated 650 metric tons of weapons-usable “fissile” material. Until the crisis, many Russians believed that their financial system might provide the means to climb out of the post-Soviet economic depression. The fact that this belief is no longer widely shared has already changed calculations among Russia’s nuclear guardians regarding the merits of performing nuclear security duties, and may eventually change calculations of the risks and benefits of stealing fissile materials. The diversion of just tens of kilograms of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to a hostile state or terrorist organization would have disastrous political and military effects for the United States, Russia, and the international system.