A Complete and Linear Physical Characterization Methodology for the Arbiter PUF Family
نویسندگان
چکیده
As intended by its name, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are considered as an ultimate solution to deal with insecure storage, hardware counterfeiting, and many other security problems. However, many different successful attacks have already revealed vulnerabilities of certain digital intrinsic PUFs. This paper demonstrates that legacy arbiter PUF and its popular extended versions (i.e., Feed-forward and XOR-enhanced) can be completely and linearly characterized by means of photonic emission analysis. Our experimental setup is capable of measuring every PUF-internal delay with a resolution of 6 picoseconds. Due to this resolution we indeed require only the theoretical minimum number of linear independent equations (i.e. physical measurements) to directly solve the underlying inhomogeneous linear system. Moreover, it is not required to know the actual PUF responses for our physical delay extraction. We present our practical results for an arbiter PUF implementation on a Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) manufactured with a 180 nanometer process. Finally, we give an insight into photonic emission analysis of arbiter PUF on smaller chip architectures by performing experiments on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) manufactured with a 60 nanometer process. This paper is an extended version of the [46], presented at CHES 2014. Extra measurements to report the prediction precision of our proposed methodology, experimenting on a smaller technology and further discussion on the provided methodology are the main novelties of this version.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
دوره 2015 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015