Rationality, Normativity and Transparency Forthcoming in Mind

نویسنده

  • Jason Bridges
چکیده

Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny’s defense of it—particularly his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it isn’t—is unsuccessful.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Reasons With Rationalism After All

Reason: New Essays on the Philosophy of Normativity, ed. Simon Robertson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bratman, M.E. Forthcoming b. Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance. Ethics. Broome, J. 2005. Have we reason to do as rationality requires? — a comment on Raz. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Symposium 1. Harman, G. 1999. ‘Practical Reasoning’. Reprinted in Reasonin...

متن کامل

Rationality, Normativity and Transparency

Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny’s defense of it—particularly his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be n...

متن کامل

Epistemic norms Engel Routledge 140509

5936 words 36634 signs 1. Epistemic normativity 2. Norms of rationality 3. Epistemic norms and concepts 4. The Ur-Norm of truth 5. Epistemic norms and epistemic values 1. Epistemic normativity When we evaluate our beliefs and our reasonings as justified or unjustified, good or bad, rational or irrational, we make, in a broad sense of the term, normative judgements about them. It is often said t...

متن کامل

Infinitism, finitude and normativity

I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008