An Algorithm for Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games.
نویسنده
چکیده
pi[M] = 3a(M). (Cf. Hirzebruch, ref. 4, Theorem 8.2.2, p. 85.) The proof of Lemma 1 is bagbd on the fact that 7rn+3(S5) is cyclic of order 24 for n > 5. t In the sense of J. H. C. Whitehead.'0 Any two regular neighborhoods of K in M are combinatorially equivalent by reference 10, Theorem 23. 1 Blij, F. van der, "An invariant of quadratic forms mod 8.," Proc. Nederl. Akad. v. Wetenschappen, Ser. A, 62, 291-293 (1959). 2 Fox, R., and J. Milnor, "Singularities of 2-spheres in 4-space and equivalence of knots," Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 63, 406, Abstract 809t (1957). 8 Haefliger, A., "Plongements diff6rentiables de vari6t6s dans varietks," Comm. Math. Helv. (to appear). 4Hirzebruch, F., Neue Topologische Methoden in der A lgebraischen Geometrie (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1956). 6 Milnor, J., and M. Kervaire, "Bernoulli numbers, homotopy groups and a theorem of Rohlin," Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians, Edinburgh, 1958.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
دوره 47 10 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1961