Pay Spread and Skewness , Employee Effort and Firm Productivity by

نویسندگان

  • Paul Bingley
  • Tor Eriksson
چکیده

We test predictions from theories of tournament, fairness and tastes for skewness about the effects of pay spread and skewness on employee effort and firm productivity. The data come from the population of 6,501 medium-to-large sized Danish private sector firms matched with all their employees during 1992-95. Potential simultaneity problems are addressed by instrumental variables provided by institutional variation in the income tax system. Differences in firm productivity effects between occupational groups and types of firms give support to the theories of fairness, tournaments and tastes for skewness. Only individual effort effects support tournament theory alone. JEL Codes: J31, J41.

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تاریخ انتشار 2001