Book Review: Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and a Culture of Precaution

Risk analysis today falls broadly into two opposite, methodological camps. Those who appeal to scientific evidence to explain or critique what they consider to be exaggerated public fears, and those who focus on sociological data to highlight people’s perceptions and hence seek to justify a more precautionary outlook. While most recognize that risk contains both a material element and a perceptual element, there is rarely a meeting of ways in their methods of analysis. This is where Adam Burgess’ contribution to the debate is to be warmly welcomed. Rather than falsely comparing the statistical risk of one activity with another, as many in the scientific camp are prone to doing, Burgess, a lecturer in sociology at the University of Bath has produced an explicitly sociological analysis. But rather than taking people’s perceptions at face value he seeks to explain how these perceptions came to be constructed in the first place, thereby, challenging these and critiquing precaution. Focusing on people’s perceptions has become the mainstay of governments, activists, the media, and even risk consultants. These suggest that our perceptions of risks are as important, if not more so, than the actuality of the risks we face, as perceptions often determine behavior. Thus, it is held, that irrespective of the basis for such fears in scientific “fact,” their effects are real in social consequence, leaving governments with little choice but to take such concerns on board and to regulate accordingly. This conciliatory approach benefits from appearing to take ordinary people’s views very seriously and incorporating these into the decision-making process. In an age when few participate actively in political life, it is commendably inclusive and democratic in outlook. It is also a godsend to governments bereft of any broader dynamic or direction. But, as others have suggested elsewhere, assuming or adapting to popular perceptions is as contemptuous of the public as dismissing them.1 It may also be more damaging. Burgess explores the advent and use of the “precautionary principle” in the European context,