The Shapley-Folkman Theorem and the Range of a Bounded Measure: An Elementary and Unified Treatment

نویسندگان

  • M. Ali Khan
  • Kali P. Rath
چکیده

We present proofs, based on the Shapley-Folkman theorem, of the convexity of the range of a strongly continuous, finitely additive measure, as well as that of an atomless, countably additive measure. We also present proofs, based on diagonalization and separation arguments respectively, of the closure of the range of a purely atomic or purely nonatomic countably additive measure. A combination of these results yields Lyapunov’s celebrated theorem on the range of a countably additive measure. We also sketch, through a comprehensive bibliography, the pervasive diversity of the applications of the Shapley-Folkman theorem in mathematical economics. (95 words)

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تاریخ انتشار 2011