Robust Stackelberg game in communication systems
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders play and choose their actions based on their information about the system and the followers choose their actions myopically according to their observations of the aggregate impact of other users. However, obtaining the exact value of these parameters is not practical in communication systems. To study the effect of uncertainty and preserve the players’ utilities in these conditions, we introduce a robust equilibrium for Stackelberg games. In this framework, the leaders’ information and the followers’ observations are uncertain parameters, and the leaders and the followers choose their actions by solving the worst-case robust optimizations. We show that the followers’ uncertain parameters always increase the leaders’ utilities and decrease the followers’ utilities. Conversely, the leaders’ uncertain information reduces the leaders’ utilities and increases the followers’ utilities. We illustrate our theoretical results with the numerical results obtained based on the power control games in the interference channels.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1108.5025 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011