Hypergame Theory for DTGT Agents

نویسنده

  • Russell R. Vane
چکیده

In this work, hypergame theory has been extended to record decision theoretic and game theoretic information in a single table, called the hypergame normal form. A twoplayer, zero-sum, single-stage hypergame has been provided in this paper to describe a decision-making situation. Hypergame expected utility is introduced as an embellished concept of expected utility that provides an estimate of the benefits and risks of this approach. Hypergame expected utility provides a preference criterion for selecting options or plans. This article does not address repeated play and learning, but does provide a new interpretation of the game theoretic concept of the Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy, which is often attributed to repeated play situations.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Advances in Hypergame Theory

This articles reprises findings from hypergame work in Vane’s doctoral dissertation [Vane 2000] that are directly applicable to decision-theoretic (DT) and game-theoretic (GT), or simply, DTGT agents. Hypergame theory meets many of the methodological requirements for bounded rationality agent research. While this early hypergame work considered expected value and worst case scenarios (from adve...

متن کامل

A Hypergame Model for Information Security

Game theory is one of the most powerful mathematical tools to model information security decision-making. However, in game theory it is assumed that all the players have complete knowledge about each player’s strategies, preferences, and decision rules used. This assumption is very strong, in reality there is often significant information asymmetry between players. In many real world situations...

متن کامل

Multi-Population Replicator Dynamics with Changes of Interpretations of Strategies

In this paper, we propose multi-population replicator dynamics with changes of players’ interpretations. We consider that each population has various interpretation functions and choose one of them depending on payoffs. We propose a model representing changes of the interpretation functions according to the payoffs. Moreover, we apply our proposed model to a well-known example of a hypergame “S...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2002