From the Assignment Model to Multi-object Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
The exposition will be divided into static and dynamic parts. By “static,” we shall mean the characterization of a multi-unit, multi-object sealed-bid auction as a pricing equilibrium. Pricing equilibria correspond to optimal solutions to the primal and dual of a certain linear programming (LP) problem. We shall give necessary and sufficient conditions, called buyers are substitutes (formulated by Shapley 1962), for the existence of a pricing equilibrium that yields the outcome of a Vickrey auction. These, as well as other static conclusions described below were demonstrated in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002a).
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تاریخ انتشار 2003