Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities à la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- RAIRO - Operations Research
دوره 48 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014