Optimization Games: An Application

Context plays a major part in the interpretation of quantified expressions in natural language. In this article, the at tention will be focused on contextual restrictions on quantification in intensional constructions such as questions, propositional at t i tude reports and epistemic sentences. It has often been observed that our interpretation of these constructions can depend on how the relevant objects are given to us (see in particular [10], and more recently [1] and [6]). The following three examples illustrate this dependence: The first example concerns an embedded wh-question. Suppose someone has killed Donald Duck. After a careful investigation you discover tha t John Smith is the culprit, you say 'John Smith did it. So I know who killed Donald Duck'. Now you want to arrest him. He is attending a masked ball. You go there, but you do not know what he looks like. You say 'This person here might be the culprit, or that person there. So I do not know who killed Donald Duck'. Your sentence 'I know who killed Donald Duck' obtains different t ru th values in the two described contexts. The evaluation of the sentence seems to be dependent on the way in which the relevant individuals are specified. These can be identified by a number of methods like naming (John Smith, Bill White, and so on) or ostension (this man here, that person there, and so on). In the first context in which identification by name is assumed, the sentence is true. In the second context, in which identification by ostension is assumed, the sentence is false. The second example expands on a well-known situation discussed by Quine in [14]. 'There is a certain man in a brown hat whom Ralph has glimpsed several times under questionable circumstances on which we need not enter here; suffice it to say that Ralph suspects he is a spy. Also there is a grey-haired man, vaguely known to Ralph as ra ther a pillar of the community, whom Ralph is not aware of having seen except once at the beach. Now Ralph does not know it but the men are one and the same.' ([14], p. 179.) We can tell each half of this story separately. In oneha l f Ralph sees the man, who is called Ortcutt , in the brown hat. In the other he sees him on the beach. From the first story you can reason as follows: 'Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy. The man in the brown hat is Ortcutt . So Ralph believes of Ortcut t that he is a spy'. From the second story you can reason as follows: 'P~alph believes that the man on the beach is not a spy. The man on the beach is Ortcutt . So Ralph does not believe of Ortcut t tha t he is a spy'. Although we do not have to assume that there is any change in Ralph's belief state, it seems unproblematic to say that Ralph believes Ortcut t to be a spy and Ralph does not