The Prisoner Dis-analogy as a Defense of Stem Cell Research on Spare Embryos

Under the premise that an embryo is a full person, the argument against using spare IVF embryos for stem cell research is the prisoner analogy. Namely, the analogy contends that just as we may not ravage a prisoner on death row for his body parts, likewise we may not harvest the embryo for its stem cells simply because it is destined for destruction. Here, I show that this comparison does not hold, for an immoral action is committed against the prisoner as a result of certain characteristics present in the prisoner but absent from the embryo. In particular, three wrongs – infliction of suffering, imposition of double punishment, and violation of human dignity – are perpetrated against the prisoner, but do not apply in the case of the embryo. Therefore, I conclude that the repudiation of the analogy implies that it is morally permissible to use spare IVF embryos for the purposes of stem cell research. Introduction According to the notion of “ethics of compromise,” it is acceptable to act in sinful ways in order to achieve a greater good, as long as certain absolutist standards are maintained