Commentary on Hunt and Carlson (2007)

‘‘Research on group differences in intelligence is scientifically valid and socially important’’ (Hunt & Carlson, 2007, this issue, p. 195). Hunt and Carlson are to be commended not only for standing up for the legitimacy of such research but also for reporting basic facts on the science that others outside the field often deny or distort. Among the much-replicated empirical findings that Hunt and Carlson mention in their article are that IQ tests measure a general learning ability, predict many kinds of life success to some degree, measure cognitive ability equally well among American Blacks and Whites (i.e., there is no measurement bias), and predict academic achievement equally well in both groups (i.e., there is no prediction bias for that outcome). In addition, large racial gaps in cognitive abilities and achievements continue to create trade-offs among goals for schools and employers. The important scientific question is not whether races differ in (average) phenotypic intelligence but why they differ. Hunt and Carlson also mention that social environments are not just external but (like IQ differences among individuals) have both genetic and environmental components and that race exists as a biological entity or continuum. Such conclusions are mainstream among specialists on human variation in intelligence (Gottfredson, 1997; Neisser et al., 1996). In regard to political intimidation against reporting such findings, Hunt and Carlson agree that such attacks occur, that they are deplorable, and that they have driven some investigators into professionally safer pursuits. Hunt and Carlson show how major social policies, such as the No Child Left Behind Act and U.S. employment discrimination law, can fail their aims and impose serious social and economic costs when they disregard such knowledge and presume a contrary reality. Scientific knowledge requires good evidence and inference; thus, the authors review various standards—their 10 principles of design, analysis, and reporting—for evaluating research articles (e.g., representativeness of samples, construct validity of measures, alternative explanations of results). It is important to note that Hunt and Carlson also point to questions that science lacks the answers to but must keep asking (e.g., Are individual and group differences in intelligence malleable by either biological or socioeducational means?). Hunt and Carlson support inquiry on group differences, in principle, but the thrust of their article is to hobble it in practice by holding it to stricter standards than other work. Thus, they inadvertently illustrate how politically unwelcome questions and answers are commonly suppressed in effect, if not by intent. I understand that they intend no such thing. Rather, as I shall illustrate, I believe they argue from faulty logical and empirical premises so ingrained in public discourse that even the most knowledgeable people often perpetuate them. The authors’ line of argument shows a struggle to reconcile principle with contrary practice. Hunt and Carlson present previous findings on race and intelligence as scientifically valid and acknowledge that researchers who report them risk nonintellectual attack, but they then suggest that the research community has invited such attacks by tolerating substandard quality. Moreover, because research on group differences is akin to ‘‘working with dynamite,’’ it ‘‘is the duty of scientists to exercise a higher standard of scientific rigor in their research’’ (p. 195). But the voluntary self-monitoring system they offer results in more stringent standards for external review (‘‘rules against dangerous play,’’ enforced by ‘‘referees,’’ p. 210). Hunt and Carlson say their aim in recommending double standards is not to suppress research showing group differences but to ‘‘[reduce] the chances that an attack will have intellectual merit’’ (p. 210). To those who fear that their recommendation will invite yet more attacks without intellectual merit, ‘‘[o]ur reply is simple: you cannot do anything about an attack that is without intellectual merit’’ because such attacks are ‘‘political rather than scientific phenomena’’ (pp. 210). Hunt and Carlson agree that their ‘‘guidelines . . . may provide ammunition for those who wish to suppress studies of racial differences . . . [that do not report] equality of groups,’’ but ‘‘we see this once again as a political problem rather than a scientific one’’ (p. 210). That, however, is precisely the problem. In the name of science, they Address correspondence to Linda S. Gottfredson, School of Education, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, e-mail: gottfred@ udel.edu. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE