Secure Water Supply

Previous to 9-11, it was assumed that a combination of small-scale bench testing plus dimensional analysis would be sufficient to model fate and transport of chemical and biological (CB) contaminants in water systems. Water security is a life safety issue. Water supply systems on military installations and forward facilities are vulnerable to both conventional, industrial and military CB agent contamination by terrorists. The pre 9-11 generation of sensors could not directly detect many common CB agents, and the few sensors that could were very expensive. The pre 9-11 generation of water distribution simulations cannot correctly model CB agent uptake on the pipe walls of a distribution system. Therefore the outcome of an attack via CB agents in the water supply is not well understood. In the post 9-11 environment, the EPA, ECBC, and ERDC stakeholders concluded that the pre-existing fate and transport models should be updated to include results from meso-scale testing. The Water Security Research Test Loop (WSRTL) is designed to help update these models with meso-scale testing of fate and transport of CB agents. The WSRTL would also serve as a test-bed to facilitate new generations of sensor technology and water treatment technology. This research is responsive to several DOD initiatives including: 1. CINC’s and services are required by DoDD 2000.12 and DoDI 2000.16 standard 26, to conduct a higher headquarters vulnerability assessment of their installations AT programs every three years. 2. The updated dynamic simulation tools can be used to support the Joint AntiTerrorism Guide (JAT Guide) 3. The Joint Future Operational Capability (JFOC) for fixed facility collective protection. 1. DESCRIPTION OF A TYPICAL WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. Figure 1 provides an excellent overview of a generic water distribution system. Fresh water is pulled from a reservoir, treated, and stored in a series of holding tanks and associated pumping stations. Water is then distributed via a network of underground pipes. It is important to note that potable water and water for fire suppression are distributed through the same pipe network. This generic system design has several inherent weaknesses: the distribution network has no redundancy; the service area subtends a large geographical area; and there is a lack of anti-tampering devices. [GAO 2003] 2. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ATTACKS ON WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS On initial inspection of the water distribution layout represented in Figure 1, it is tempting to guess that a chemical or biological agent could be introduced at the water reservoir or the treatment plant. This method of attack would allow the attacker to act at some distance from the kill zone. The attack may have one of two basic objectives: denial of service or human casualties. As the system has few redundant components, a denial of service attack at the reservoir or treatment center is a real possibility, especially through the use of high explosives. In order to create widespread casualties, however, the amount of contaminant required to permeate the whole system would, after taking dilution into account, either be too large to handle expeditiously or far more expensive than other readily available terrorist weapons. Within the water distribution industry, this concept is summarized by the phrase dilution is the solution. Hence, a CB attack capable of causing casualties must be initiated close to the target facility. Conceding that an attack with CB agents must take place somewhere in the distribution system close to the target, several misconceptions about this type of attack still persist. Current dogma holds that such attacks require the assistance of several technicians, are expensive to carry out, and require pumping equipment to inject contaminants into a pressurized system. [ASHRAE 2004] More recent studies by the Corps of Engineers, among Report Documentation Page Form Approved