Mikołaj Domaradzki Cognitive Critique of Generative Grammar

geographical relations and land areas. This projection is based on a very basic kinesthetic image-schematic structure. An image schema is a simple structure which is ingrained in everyday human bodily experience and becomes meaningful precisely due to its embodiment. In our example, the kinesthetic image-schematic structure is the Mikołaj Domaradzki 46 container schema: since many a thing can be understood in terms of a container that contrasts an interior with an exterior, we conceptualize the surrounding world by means of this image schema and metaphorically understand geographical places such as countries or cities in terms of containers, in and out of which we can move. As matter of fact, we view the entire world in terms of a container, when we differentiate between this world in which we find ourselves at present and the other (future or past) world which is located either outside this one or above it. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:29 and 1999:497) argue that every grammatical structure is rooted (or as they put it: embodied) in a preconceptual structure that renders the articulation of the human bodily experience possible. Their findings culminate in the thesis that for cognitive semantics concepts are embodied and metaphorical in nature. The embodiment of concepts means that they are founded on human bodily orientations and interactions, whereas the postulate that concepts are of metaphorical nature means that abstract concepts are founded on metaphorical extensions or projections from concepts that are directly embodied. Summing up, one should put it in no uncertain terms that contrary to the assumptions made by generative semantics, metaphor is not just some negligible stylistic or rhetorical extra, as it, in fact, underlies our mental life. Naturally, metaphors such as purgata auris had been known long before Metaphors We Live by was published. Nonetheless, Lakoff and Jonhson deserve full credit for conducting analyses of language that would hardly be possible, had they been based on abstract, logical form alone. Several important observations must be made here. Firstly, metaphorical extensions cannot be reduced to some derivational rules. Secondly, metaphoric models can hardly be viewed as accurate representations of the objective world, since they are products of human cognitive apparatus. With reference to the latter observation, one should perhaps add that the generative disregard for figurative language was triggered off not only by the sole concentration on clause patterns, but also by the assumption that only literal meaning could correspond to reality and, thereby, be true or false. Figurative meaning, being devoid of any meaning that could represent the world, was excluded from the realm of semantics, precisely due to its inability to correctly mirror entities in the external world. With the situation being as it is, it goes without saying that contrary to the generative stream cognitive linguistics does not resort to truth-conditional semantics, but in lieu of such dubious criteria as adequacy or correspondence, metaphors are characterized in terms of their usefulness or aptness. Thus, cognitive linguistics joins contemporary pragmatism in renouncing all claims to a linguistic description that would be true in any absolute sense. On cognitive account, linguistic knowledge, like any knowledge is a construct or invention rather than a reflection or representation. Finally, it has to accentuated that the mappings of physical domains onto abstract ones can hardly be labeled as contingent correspondences, since they are rather ‘highly motivated links between parallel or analogous areas of physical and internal sensation’ (Sweetser, 1990:45). This brings us to the issue of the symbolic nature of language, a point where cognitive linguistics strongly departs from the structuralist tradition. 4 Cf. e.g. the German opposition between das Diesseits and das Jenseits. 5 Cf. e.g. the old Greek opposition between oiJ a[nw and oiJ kavtw which culminates in the religious conceptualization based on the heaven and hell opposition. One could, presumably, maintain that if Platonism can be explained in terms of ‘World is a Container’ metaphor and ‘Quality is Up’ metaphor, then it can be characterized as an experientially based metaphor. Cognitive Critique of Generative Grammar 47 When cognitive linguistics investigates various motivating factors in the choice of linguistic forms it does not question the conventionality of linguistic expressions. Cognitive linguistics does agree with de Saussure on the arbitrariness of the link between words and concepts. The association of the sequences of sounds in words such as container or country with what these words refer to is arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is hardly arbitrary that certain physical features of containers are mapped onto countries so that just as something can be in[side] or out[side] of a container, so somebody can live in[side] or out[side] a country. The conceptual metaphor which underlies this mapping provides an explanation why countries are conceptualized as containers and not as, say, animals – as it is frequently in the case of emotions. In the context of cognitive critique of the generative approach, two observations need to be made. Firstly, the existence of such metaphorical mappings makes it possible for cognitive linguistics to view many a linguistic expression as highly motivated rather than completely arbitrary. Secondly, the obvious pervasiveness of such conceptual universals makes cognitive semantics protest against reducing language studies to a quest for formal or substantive universals, as it happens in the generative stream (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1965:28 sqq.). Let us explain the latter point on the example of emotions. Apart from the obvious examples that can be taken from European languages, the Arabic language offers reliable testimony that emotions are metaphorically viewed as wild animals, since, for instance, the verb ṣabara means ‘bind’, ‘fetter’ and ‘shackle’, on the one hand, and ‘be patient’, ‘have patience’ on the other. Inasmuch as it is equally common for emotions to be metaphorically presented as fire, a very interesting linguistic observation can be made here. If we consider that the Latin ardeo means ‘burn’, ‘be on fire’ or ‘be ablaze’, then it comes as no surprise that many a European language follows the metaphorical mapping and, consequently, just as ardeo is easily used of feelings such as love, so, for instance, the Danish brænde can occur in phrases such as brænde af begær, which means ‘burn with desire’ or brænde efter at which means ‘be dying to’. If, however, also the Arabic taḥarraqa means ‘burn’, ‘be aflame’, ‘be consumed by fire’ and ‘be consumed by an emotion’, then one might venture to purport that at least certain metaphorical mappings can be characterized as conceptual universals. This becomes of vital importance, for, as already observed, while generative grammar reduces language studies to a quest for substantive and formal universals, cognitive linguistics suggests the possibility of universals that are based on the generally human bodily experience. 6 Due to the paramount importance of the issue of conceptual metaphors, we cannot refrain from quoting three more interesting examples. The metaphor ‘Mind is a Container’ is to be found in Latin where animus is metaphorically viewed as a container in which one can store ideas and intentions. Hence, the famous query: ‘quae nunc animo sententia surgit?’. As one can say ‘habeo (est mihi) in animo’, which means literally ‘I have it in my mind;, i.e., ‘I intend to’, it comes as no surprise that the same metaphor is to be found in French, German and Danish. Thus, the French ‘se mettre quelque chose dans l’esprit’ means literally ‘put something in one’s mind’, i.e., ‘remember’, while ‘cela m’est sorti de l’esprit’ means literally ‘it has left (gone out of) my mind’, i.e., ‘it slipped my mind’. Likewise in German and Danish. You can have something in mind in German (etwas im Sinne haben) and in Danish (have noget i sinde), in the sense that you intend it and, interestingly enough, in Danish you can also take it into your head to do something (få i sinde at gøre noget). Subsequently, if we take the ‘Argument is Journey’ metaphor, than in Danish we have the expression gå ind på which means ‘go into’ or ‘enter’ and at the same time ‘agree’, ‘accept’. In Greek, the verb sugcwrevw means ‘go together with’, ‘meet’ and ‘agree’ and, eventually in Arabic, the root w-f-q among others refers to such activities as ‘bring to agreement’, ‘reconcile’ (II), ‘to correspond’, ‘harmonize’, ‘meet’, ‘encounter’ (III) and finally ‘agree’ (VIII). The last Mikołaj Domaradzki 48 All in all, cognitive linguistics very often regards the relationship between words and concepts as an extension that is well-motivated and not random. Many grammatical constructions are, thus, not arbitrary, but embodied, i.e., reflecting the basic human bodily experience. However, metaphors are by no means the only linguistic expressions that cognitive linguistics characterizes as motivated. Cognitive linguists argue that also polymorphemic linguistic signs should be seen as nonarbitrary. These are considered to be motivated and analyzable, for notwithstanding their conventional form, they do remain motivated by their constituents. Problems of Morphology Cognitive linguistic views grammatical constructions as holistic, inasmuch as it considers the meaning of the whole construction to be motivated by the meanings of its components, but at the same time rejects the idea that the meaning of a grammatical construction could be computed from the meanings of its components. This postulate of cognitive linguistics is of utmost importance, for it suggests that lexical constructions cannot always be rule-derived in the generative fashion. A classic example is given by Langacker (1987:15) who analyzes constructions such as waiter which instantiate the V + -er derivational pattern. Now, if waiter is simply to be derived from the V + -er rule, than Langacker asks why its meaning is hardly reducible to ‘something or somebody that waits’. The scholar argues that the view according to which a form either is or is not derived by the rule is simplistic, since one should rather say that waiter does instantiate the V + -er pattern, i.e., that its organization and meaning are determined in large measure by the rule, even though it has properties above and beyond those that the rule specifies (ibid, cf. also 1999:92). Langacker has coined the term exclusionary fallacy to describe the erroneous assumption that one interpretation of a linguistic phenomenon precludes another. Thus, he explains that in order to correctly analyze constructions such as waiter one must not be unwilling to say that the construction is derived by the V + -er rule, but at the same time it does have a meaning that is not reducible to its components. The outcome is that a cognitive analysis perceives both accounts as complementary and not mutually exclusive. With constructions such as waiter, we can clearly observe that although motivated, the meaning of a grammatical construction cannot always be computed from the meanings of its parts. Langacker’s favorite explanatory metaphor is that component structures cannot be characterized as ‘building blocks’, in which the meaning of the potential conceptual universal that we feel tempted to cite is the personification of time. If one can kill time in languages as various as Danish (slå tiden ihjel), Arabic (qatala al-waqt) and Polish (zabijać czas), then it seems reasonable to assume the potential existence of conceptual universals. If it is true that languages (or at least many of them) make use of the same metaphors, then the explanatory potential of the cognitive account becomes evident. Cognitive Critique of Generative Grammar 49 entire construction is simply a sum of its components that are stacked together. With regard to the cognitive account of morphology, some very illustrative examples can be taken from the Arabic language, where all linguistic signs in Arabic are highly motivated by the structure of the root. The gist of the Arabic root system is that roots, comprising for the most part three letters, convey some basic meaning so that k-t-b, for instance, conveys the idea of writing or inscribing. A couple of important remarks can be made here. To begin with, one can hardly maintain that such a morphological structure is abstract and meaningless. Obviously, vowels (and sometimes also other consonants) need to be added, if the word is to have any definite meaning, but it is undeniable that every root can be ascribed some basic meaning. Thus, if the meaning underlying is that of writing, then the word can produce such associated words as ‘to write’, ‘book’, ‘correspondence’, ‘literature’, ‘library’, ‘typewriter’ ‘author’, ‘office’, ‘school’ etc. Now, as every root can lead to a great number of words, which are related to the basic meaning of the three root letters, it is evident that the words are motivated by the root. What has to be stressed is that, being obviously motivated, the words can be predicted or derived only to some extent. If we consider such forms as verbal nouns, we can see that they are indeed motivated, but absolute predictability is out of the question. We can naturally formulate some morphological rules, but in the long run it is not possible to guarantee the absolute predictability that is typical of formal languages. Accordingly, one cannot guarantee that the patterns, which create kitâba (the act of writing), maktab (office), maktaba (library), miktâb (typewriter) or mukâtaba (correspondence), to name but a few, will always operate without any additional semantic contributions. In the light of this, a cognitive linguist will retain de Saussure’s stance that linguistic signs (in this particular case the root k-t-b) are arbitrary, but he will simultaneously point out that many linguistic expressions (as for instance maktab or miktâb) are not only motivated (being based on the root consonants), but also incapable of being rule-derived with absolute predictability. Furthermore, if one considers such an example as the root ṣ-b-h ̣, which at the same time refers to ‘morning’ and ‘beauty’, these being further associated with ‘freshness’ and ‘youth’, then it is reasonable to say the motivation in the Arabic language can be seen as not only of structural, but also of conceptual nature. This is clearly reflected in many metaphorical extensions such as when fatah ̣a, which first and foremost means ‘open’, is 7 Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that the generative approach assumes that if the meaning of a construction is not a sum of the meanings of its components, then it is a dictionary definition that suffices to describe the meaning. On cognitive view, such an approach also results in an extremely impoverished and, therefore, inadequate semantics of natural language. Although the dictionary view of semantics opens the possibility for a neat and closed account of semantics, cognitive linguistics opts for the encyclopedic approach. When Langacker defines grammar as ‘a structured inventory of conventional linguistic units’ (1987:57), he rejects the ‘generative’ view of grammar. Consequently, grammar is no longer seen as ‘providing a formal enumeration of all and only the well-formed sentences of a language’ (ibid. 63), since it precludes the encyclopedic view of semantics, i.e., the open-ended character of meanings. Langacker stresses that it is hardly possible to exhaustively describe the meaning of a linguistic expression by a dictionary definition alone, as the preponderance of concepts must be understood with reference to more than one domain. Langacker gives the example (ibid. 154) of the concept [BANANA], which comprises specifications from such domains as the spatial or taste domain and many abstract domains. In view of this, he argues that the meaning of a concept is encyclopedic, since it comprises semantics and pragmatics, i.e. linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge. Mikołaj Domaradzki 50 used metaphorically, as in fatah ̣a-l-bint, where it means ‘deflower’. It is, presumably, the underlying meaning of the root that motivates this metaphorical projection. Lastly, it is evident, that constructions in Arabic are more than sums of meanings of their constituents. Apart from the k-t-b examples, one can point that qatala means ‘kill’, ‘assassinate’ and ‘murder’, but its verbal noun qitl denotes ‘enemy’, ‘foe’ or ‘opponent’, i.e. ‘somebody whom one desires to slay’. In opposition to the generative stream, cognitive account assumes that grammaticalness, like everything in language, is a matter of degree, since it is conditioned by given coding strategies. Small wonder then that the possibilities for creating novel expressions transpire practically unlimited and that virtually any morphological or syntactic pattern can be used with a view to producing them. Accordingly, per analogiam to units such as writer or killer, which are instantiations of the V + -er rule and denote a person that performs the activity described by the word, the language user can come up with a novel expression such as rebuffer. Given the V + -er schema, cognitive linguistics maintains that such schemas can be extrapolated irrespective of whether we deal with lexical and figurative extensions or grammatical productivity, but it has to be borne in mind that in all cases the search for absolute predictability that is characteristic of formal languages is a wild-goose chase. If the generative view pivots on the idea that it is necessary either to derive or to enumerate the whole set of structures that can be generated, then on cognitive account it is by no means possible to present either an algorithm that would render it possible to compute all expressions from a set of rewriting rules or a full list of such structures, the impossibility being due to the fact that such an algorithm or such a list would have to include the whole of human cognitive experience. In the light of the assumption that with regard to their meaning (conceptual content) grammatical constructions are not reducible to the meaning of their components, cognitive linguistics suspends the traditional division of morphemes into lexical (content) and grammatical (function) and acknowledges that grammatical morphemes make important semantic contribution to the constructions they occur in (Langacker 1987:19). Again, this cannot be overemphasized, since inasmuch as cognitive linguistics repudiates the reductionist approach which assumes that the meaning of a construction is a sum of the meanings of its components, cognitive critique demonstrates that it is not possible to predict the behavior of natural languages with the same exactness that is typical of formal languages. The grammar of natural language is conditioned by specific human cognitive mechanism and that is why very often the meaning of a construction is generally more than the given morphemes and the rules for their combination. However, the unpredictability of natural language can be observed not only at the level of morphology, but also at the level of syntax, as neither lexical constructions nor sentences can always be rule-derived in the generative fashion. 8 Thus, Langacker argues that even the preposition of, which in the generative stream has always been characterized as devoid of any semantic value, can be viewed as meaningful (cf. Langacker 1999:73 sqq.) Cognitive Critique of Generative Grammar 51