Ratification and Veto Constraints in Mechanism
نویسنده
چکیده
This note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratification. This notion is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power. We exhibit allocations that are not ratifiable and nevertheless can be implemented through a mechanism that gives veto power to the agents.
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