Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players.
نویسنده
چکیده
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.
منابع مشابه
Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
We study infinitely repeated anonymous random matching games played by communities of players, who only observe the outcomes of their own matches. It is well known that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium for the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) through grim trigger strategies. Little is known about games beyond the PD. We study a new equilibrium concept, strongly uniform equilibrium (SUE, which...
متن کاملRepeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players
This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish. An example is constructed to show that when games are played a finite number of times, partitioning of the game set according to a coarse exogenously given partition might introduc...
متن کاملEquilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
In this paper we analyze players’ long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring in a large population. Players can observe signals corresponding to other players’ unseen actions and use the proposed simple or maximum likelihood estimation algorithm to extract information from the signals. In the simple learning process we find conditions for the risk-dominant an...
متن کاملNash Dominance with Applications to Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints
We examine a novel idea for the detection of Nash Equilibrium developed in [14] and apply it to Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPECs). EPECs are Nash games which uniquely feature players constrained by a condition governing equilibrium of a parametric system. By redefining the selection criteria used in evolutionary methods, EPECs can be solved using Evolutionary Multiobject...
متن کاملStochastic Perturbations of Discontinuous Dynamics with Applications to Game Theory
The Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory and in economic theory. However, as a static notion it does not help us to understand how the equilibrium is reached or how an equilibrium is selected when a game has multiple equilibria. Thus, dynamical models that are based on best responding, i.e., models where the players are trying to maximize their payoffs in order the reach an equilibr...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of theoretical biology
دوره 232 1 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005