The pricing mechanism to the buyer with a budget constraint and an indirect mechanism
نویسنده
چکیده
The present article considers the situation in which the buyer’s taste and budget are his private information. In this multi-dimensional setting, we study the optimal mechanism through a canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional context: a function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. In our multi-dimensional context, however, this is an indirect mechanism. We investigate the effectiveness and limit of this indirect mechanism in the framework of the revelation principle. JEL Classification: D82, D42
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تاریخ انتشار 2004