On Shapley-Shubik Equilibria with Financial Markets1
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چکیده
In this paper we extend the Shapley-Shubik model to a two period financial economy and essentially address the question of the existence of an equilibrium. More precisely, we show the existence of nice equilibria, i.e. situation in which prices for both assets and commodities are strictly positive. Even if the general lines of the proof are largely influenced by the paper of Dubey-Shubik (1978), most of the arguments are new because of the financial nature of the economy. It forces us to deal with a generalized Nash equilibrium and to proscribe the use of arguments which only works with a single cash-in-advance constraint.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008