Theory Eliminativism as a Methodological Tool

Scientific Theory Eliminativism

The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of the...

Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky’s Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior

The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although i...

Reductionism and its heuristics: Making methodological reductionism honest

Methodological reductionists practice ‘wannabe reductionism’. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as “reductionist”. “Successional reduction” and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific pro...

Some Notes on Critical Appraisal of Prevalence Studies; Comment on: “The Development of a Critical Appraisal Tool for Use in Systematic Reviews Addressing Questions of Prevalence”

Decisions in healthcare should be based on information obtained according to the principles of Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM). An increasing number of systematic reviews are published which summarize the results of prevalence studies. Interpretation of the results of these reviews should be accompanied by an appraisal of the methodological quality of the included data and studies. The critical a...

Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox