Science and God: An automatic opposition between ultimate explanations

Science and religion have come into conflict repeatedly throughout history, and one simple reason for this is the two offer competing explanations for many of the same phenomena. We present evidence that the conflict between these two concepts can occur automatically, such that increasing the perceived value of one decreases the automatic evaluation of the other. In Experiment 1, scientific theories described as poor explanations decreased automatic evaluations of science, but simultaneously increased automatic evaluations of God. In Experiment 2, using God as an explanation increased automatic evaluations of God, but decreased automatic evaluations of science. Religion and science both have the potential to be ultimate explanations, and these findings suggest that this competition for explanatory space can create an automatic opposition in evaluations. 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Recent debates over intelligent design theory in science education have brought long-standing conflicts between science and religion back into public attention. On the surface, religion and science may seem to be very different domains: science is directed toward the understanding of physical systems, and religion is concerned with more intangible spiritual and moral issues (Gould, 1999). Some scientists suggest that science and religion can be reconciled as compatible belief systems (Collins, 2006). Others, meanwhile, are more skeptical and argue that the two ideologies are inherently opposed, and that belief in one necessarily undermines belief in the other (Dawkins, 2006; Zukav, 2001). Although science and religion do not always conflict, a frequent source of tension concerns the competition for explanatory space. Religion and science offer different explanations for a wide array of phenomena, including some of the most fundamental human issues (e.g. intelligent design vs. natural selection). This direct opposition may cause the value of religion and science to become inversely related when these explanations are brought into mind. In the present research we investigate whether the evaluation of science and religion may be automatically opposed, such that increasing the perceived value of one as an explanatory system diminished automatic positive evaluations of the other. Explanation and belief Causal explanations enable people to understand and predict the world around them. Unexpected or unusual events automatically prompt a search for causes (Weiner, 1985), and causal inferences can be generated spontaneously with little effort by the thinker (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002). All explanations are not created equal, however, and people prefer those that appear most simple and coherent (Lombrozo, 2007). Explanations gain cognitive support and psychological value as they appear to explain more observations with fewer causes (Keil, 2006; Preston & Epley, 2005), especially those that explain diverse effects that are branched far apart on a causal tree (Kim & Keil, 2003). In contrast, alternate explanations for the same effects may possess a negative association between them (Thagard, 2006), such that the perceived validity of one can impact the perceived validity of the other (Sloman, 1994). Just as it is impossible to believe a single proposition to be both true and false simultaneously (Gilbert, 1991), it may be impossible to hold two competing explanations as both true (or both false) simultaneously. As a result, the availability of one plausible explanation may therefore diminish the perceived value of another (Morris & Larrick, 1995). As broad explanatory systems, religion and science each provide answers to a wide array of fundamental questions and concerns, and so each have strong explanatory value. However, these belief systems often provide different explanations for the same phenomena, and this competition for explanatory space can trigger conflict. Instances of this recurring conflict can be found throughout history. Advances in scientific theories that contradict religious explanations can threaten these beliefs and are often met with resistance. Conversely, when scientific explanations are poor, the value of religious explanations may be enhanced. The central argument of intelligent design theory is to point out gaps or failings in scientific explanations, thereby enabling explanations based on other (generally divine) causes. This is sometimes called the God of the Gaps argument (Lupfer, 0022-1031/$ see front matter 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.013 * Corresponding author. Fax: +1 217 244 5876. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (J. Preston). Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2009) 238–241