A response to Baltag, Girard, and White

The aim of this short note is to o¤er some brief responses to the comments (on Dietrich and List 2013) that we have received from Alexandru Baltag and, in a coauthored piece, Patrick Girard and Shaun White. We would like to begin by thanking Baltag, Girard, andWhite for their thoughtful and generous comments. Given space constraints, unfortunately, we are not able to do full justice to all their interesting suggestions, thoughts, and questions here, but we hope to address at least some of their central points. Although Baltag on the one hand and Girard and White on the other raise a number of distinct issues, there is some thematic overlap between them. Several of the comments concern the formal properties and substantive interpretation of the ‘weighing relation’, a central concept in our reason-based model of preference formation. In what follows, we …rst recapitulate the concepts of reason-based preferences and the underlying weighing relation and then address some of the questions Baltag, Girard, and White raise about those concepts and about our approach more generally.