Some Further Results on the Winner’s Rent in the Second-Price Business Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
The winner’s rent for a buyer’s auction is shown to be decreasing in the number of bidders according to the mean residual life order if the common distribution of valuations is of decreasing mean residual life. Stochastic comparisons of the conditional winner’s rent are conducted for both buyer’s case and reverse case. AMS (2000) subject classification. Primary 60E15; secondary 60K10, 62N05.
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تاریخ انتشار 2009