On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
نویسندگان
چکیده
Pearces (1984) extensive-form rationalizablity (EFR) is a solution concept embodying a best-rationalization principle (Battigalli 1996, Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002)) for forward-induction reasoning. EFR strategies may hence be distinct from backward-induction (BI) strategies. We provide a direct and transparent proof that in perfect-information games with no relevant ties, the unique BI outcome is nevertheless identical to the unique EFR outcome, even when the EFR strategy pro le and the BI strategy pro le are distinct.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 44 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015