Sequential Pseudomarkets: Welfare Economics in Random Assignment Economies
نویسنده
چکیده
We study random assignment economies with expectedutility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. Inspired on Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979) Pseudomarket mechanism (PM) and on a serial dictatorship, we introduce the Sequential Pseudomarket (SP) where groups of agents are called turn by turn and participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. To measure e¢ ciency, we focus on the set of ex-ante Paretooptimal (PO) random assignments and on the ex-ante weak core (CO). We nd: 1) PM PO but the converse is not always true (there is no Second Theorem of Welfare Economics), 2) PO SP but the converse is not always true, 3) SP CO
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