The Second Sexism by David Benatar

In societies rn which sex discrimination has been recognized to be 1,vrong, the assault on this form of discrimination has targeted those atti­ tudes and practices that (directly) disadvantage women and girls. At the most, there has been only scant attention to those manifestations of sex discrirnination of which the primary victims are men and boys. What little recognition there has been of discrimination against males has very rarely resulted in amelioration. For these reasons, we might refer to dis­ crimination against males as the "second sexism," to adapt Simone de Beauvoir's famous phrase. The second sexism is the neglected sexism, the sexism that is not taken seriously even by most of those who oppose sex dis-:.::rimination. This is regrettable not only because of its implica­ tions for ongoing unfair male disadvantage, but also, as I shall argue later; because discrimination against women cannot fully be addressed v:ithout attending to all forms of sexism. So unrecognized is the second sexism that the mere mention of it will appear laughable to some. For this reason, some examples of male dis­ advai.,tage need to be provided. Although I think that all the examples I sl--:all prcvide happen to be, to a considerable extent, either instances or consequences of sex discrimination, there is a conceptual and moral dis­ tinction to be drawn between disadvantage and discrimination. I shall follow the convention of understanding discrimination as the unfair dis­ advant2_ging of somebody on the basis of some morally irrelevant feature such as a person's sex. Discrimination need not be intentional. It is the ef ect rather than the intent of a law, policy, convention, or expectation that is relevant to de­ terrr1ining whether somebody is unfairly disadvantaged. Discrimination also need not be direct, as it is when one sex is explicitly prohibited from occupying some position. There are powerful social forces that shape the expectations or preferences of men and women so that significantly dis­ proportionate numbers of men and women aspire to particular positions. Here indirect or subtle discrimination is operative. I shall not defend the claims that discriIBination can be indirect and need not be intentional.