Political Campaigns and Big Data<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f1" ptype="fjep28251" citart="citart1"><sup></sup></xref>
نویسنده
چکیده
T he all-encompassing goal of political campaigns is to maximize the probability of victory. To that end, every facet of a campaign is evaluated by how many votes an activity will generate and at what cost. To perform this cost–benefi t analysis, campaigns need accurate predictions about the preferences of voters, their expected behaviors, and their responses to campaign outreach. For instance, efforts to increase voter turnout are counterproductive if the campaign mobilizes people who support the opponent. Over the past six years, campaigns have become increasingly reliant on analyzing large and detailed datasets to create the necessary predictions. While the adoption of these new analytic methods has not radically transformed how campaigns operate, the improved effi ciency gives data-savvy campaigns a competitive advantage. This has led the political parties to engage in an arms race to leverage ever-growing volumes of data to create votes. This paper describes the utility and evolution of data in political campaigns. The techniques used as recently as a decade or two ago by political campaigns to predict the tendencies of citizens appear extremely rudimentary by current standards. At that time, citizens’ likely support was gauged primarily by their party affi liations and the “performance” of the precincts in which they lived (that is, what Political Campaigns and Big Data
منابع مشابه
Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f1" ptype="fmic61182" citart="citart1"><sup></sup></xref>
We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including “strange bedfellow” coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outco...
متن کاملAffect as a Decision-Making System of the Present<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1" ptype="f668644" citart="citart1" /><xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn2" ptype="f668644" citart="citart1" />
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. .
متن کاملFinancial Deprivation Prompts Consumers to Seek Scarce Goods<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1" ptype="f664038" citart="citart1" /><xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn2" ptype="f664038" citart="citart1" />
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
متن کاملYou Get What You Pay For? Self-Construal Influences Price-Quality Judgments<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1" ptype="f670034" citart="citart1" /><xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn2" ptype="f670034" citart="citart1" />
متن کامل
Does Money Illusion Matter?: Reply<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f1" ptype="faer10431063" citart="citart1"><sup></sup></xref>
The data in Fehr and Tyran (2001) and Petersen and Winn (2014) show that money illusion plays an important role in nominal price adjustment after a fully anticipated negative monetary shock. Money illusion affects subjects’ expectations, and causes pronounced nominal inertia after a negative shock but much less inertia after a positive shock. Thus Petersen and Winn (2014) provide a misleading i...
متن کامل