Do Statistical Laws Solve the ‘Problem of Provisos’?

In ‘Ceteris Paribus, There is No Problem of Provisos’ (1999), John Earman and John T. Roberts defend the view that the laws of fundamental physics are expressed by universal generalizations. These fundamental physical laws, Earman and Roberts argue, are strict laws and not qualified by ceteris paribus clauses. As physics, the special sciences also use generalizations to explain, to predict and to intervene. But, in contrast to physics, these generalizations should not be understood as strict universal laws. Earman and Roberts’s proposal is to interpret non-strict special science generalizations as statistical generalizations about correlations. Earman and Roberts claim that the statistical generalizations are not qualified by ceteris paribus (henceforth, cp) conditions. As a consequence of their view, neither the law statements of fundamental physics nor special science generalizations are cp-law statements. Hence, they conclude, there simply is no problem of provisos (that is, cp-conditions) that philosophers ought to address. In a sequel to Earman and Roberts (1999), Earman, Roberts and Smith pitilessly break the