Making a Difference in a Deterministic World

Determinism precludes moral responsibility, some think, because causally determined agents cannot make a difference in the world. Let’s say that I raise my arm at a certain time. If determinism is true, there is nothing I could have done that would have resulted in a different state of affairs, that is, in my not raising my arm at that time. For my raising my arm was bound to happen, given the remote past and the laws of nature. In addition, there is nothing I could have done to make it the case that the remote past or the laws were different. Hence, there is nothing I could have done to make it the case that I didn’t raise my arm at the time. It follows that all of our choices and acts are unavoidable, and so is everything that happens in the world (see van Inwagen 1983, chap. 3; and Ginet 1990, chap. 5). In response, some philosophers have conceded that causally determined agents cannot make a difference in the world, but they have argued that it doesn’t follow from this that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, for causally determined agents can be respon-