Sexual Harassment Policy and Incentives to Social Interaction

Laws discourage both illegal activity and legitimate activity that could be mistaken as illegal, particularly if the penalty is sufficiently high. This paper demonstrates that policies designed to fight sexual harassment can lead to a decrease in appropriate social interaction due to the potential for mistake and the significance of its penalties. The model describes the expected payoffs of communication and how such policy affects them, demonstrating that if the possibility of mistake exists, anti-harassment policy will deter innocent communication. The paper further describes the effects of anti-harassment policy in a hierarchical, two-gender workplace in which social relationships with superiors and colleagues influence whether a worker receives a promotion. The model shows that in this situation, anti-harassment policy primarily harms female employees, and harms them more if they are the minority gender in the workplace. The model holds implications not only for anti-harassment policy but for any area featuring by reporting and the potential for mistake.