Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency

It seems mere common sense to begin any serious discussion of terrorism with an attempt at definition. After all, how can we talk sensibly about the topic unless we know what the topic is? It is true that there are various objections to common sense at this point, but I shall not pursue them here beyond remarking that widespread disarray among theorists about what to count as terrorism suggests the importance of declaring a definitional position at the outset and noting its major intellectual and moral implications. My proposal, which I have defended more fully elsewhere, is to concentrate on one key element in common responses to and fears about terrorism, namely, the idea that it involves “innocent” victims. This element features in various ways in many definitional proposals and in much of the heated debate about the evils of terrorism. This focus also usefully provides a point of connection with the moral apparatus of just war theory, specifically the principle of discrimination and its requirement of noncombatant immunity. Of course, terrorism does not always take place in the context of all-out international war, but it usually has a war-like dimension. I will define it as follows: the organized use of violence to attack noncombatants or innocents (in a special sense) or their property for political purposes. This might be thought too restrictive in one direction since the threat to use such