Repeated Games Played in a Network
نویسندگان
چکیده
Delayed perfect monitoring in an in nitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighborsbehavior only, but communicate over time the repeated games history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payo¤ set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payo¤ space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the networks diameter, and not on its clustering coe¢ cient as in other models. JEL classi cation numbers: C72, C73, L14
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تاریخ انتشار 2006