Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and the cost of debt
نویسندگان
چکیده
Using hand-collected data on directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), we analyze the effect of D&O insurance on the cost of debt. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher at-issue bond yields (to maturity) and higher loan spreads. This evidence suggests that debtholders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard and/or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. The greater use of D&O insurance appears to raise the cost of debt financing. * We would like to thank conference participants at the 2011 International Conference on Corporate Finance and Financial Market in Hong Kong, and seminar participants at the University of Hong Kong and the University of International Business and Economics for helpful comments. We greatly appreciate research assistance by Joyce Li, Hoi Lo, and Chunning Ma.
منابع مشابه
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Corporate Risk and Risk Taking: New Panel Data Evidence on the Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
In this paper, we develop and estimate models of the determinants of firms’ demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. We add to and validate the existing empirical literature by testing hypotheses regarding the relationship between D&O insurance purchase and firm size, governance characteristics and business risk. Our data set allows us to test both purchase decisions and limits ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2011