Is psychological science a-cultural?

The history of psychological science, as it has intersected with ethnoracial, cultural, and other marginalized domains of group difference, is replete with disinterest, dismissal, or denigration of these diverse forms of psychological experience. This has led some to wonder whether psychological science is a-cultural, or even anti-cultural in orientation. Assessment of this provocative proposition first requires exploration of three composite questions: (1) What is culture?, (2) What is science?, and (3) What is psychological science? Based on brief consideration of these composite questions--which are remarkably complex in their own right--I argue that psychological science is not, has never been, and indeed cannot in principle be a-cultural. Instead, like all forms of knowing, psychological science emerges at particular historical moments to achieve particular goals that are motivated by particular interests. Throughout much of the history of psychological science, these goals and interests were tied to ideologically suspect agendas that contemporary psychologists are right to repudiate. The interesting question becomes whether psychology's knowledge practices can be disentangled from this earlier ideological contamination to furnish the discipline with viable methods. I propose that psychological science can in fact be so disentangled; nevertheless, the resulting methods are never adopted or deployed outside of culturally constituted interests, objectives, and motivations, thereby requiring ongoing critical engagement with the subtexts of disciplinary knowledge production. In fact, there seem to be important ways in which psychology's scientific aspirations hobble disciplinary inquiry into the human condition that has motivated multicultural psychologists to consider alternative paradigms of inquiry.