On ‘ Reverse Auction : the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game
نویسنده
چکیده
Received (received date) Revised (revised date) Accepted (accepted date) In Zeng et al. [Fluct. Noise Lett. 7 (2007) L439–L447] the analysis of the lowest unique positive integer game is simplified by some reasonable assumptions that make the problem tractable for arbitrary numbers of players. However, here we show that the solution obtained for rational players is not a Nash equilibrium and that a rational utility max-imizer with full computational capability would arrive at a solution with a superior expected payoff. An exact solution is presented for the three-and four-player cases and an approximate solution for an arbitrary number of players.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008