Ape Signing: Problems of Method and Interpretation

R E P O R T S I N T H E LAST DECADE that apes can learn to communicate with humans using a rudimentary form of sign lang~agel-~ have been received with great interest. For many anthropologists, linguists, philosophers, and psychologists, research with apes such as Washoe, Koko, and others appeared to provide decisive evidence bearing on several fundamental issues. For example, the belief that language is species-specific could not be sustained if apes acquired some linguistic facility, as these projects seemed to indicate. The apes’ performance also appeared to rescue learning-theoretic views of language acquisition from critical analyses such as Chomsky’s.6 The methods used in the ape sign language projects were derived from such theories, and some researchers were self-consciously behavioristic in orientation.’ Whatever the logical merit of such criticism of empiricist theories of language acquisition, it might be waived aside if the apes acquired linguistic skills through shaping and differential reinforcement of responses. This would at the same time undermine strongly nativist positions. This research has gained renown outside the academic community through accounts in the print and broadcast media, documentary and educational films, and popularized texts. As might be expected, the mass media accepted the ape researchers’ claims uncritically, focusing instead on speculation. If apes can talk, what will they say? Will they be